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1 Introduction 
This paper proposes the creation of national (currency specific) registers of short 
term monetary and money-like liabilities, and the use of these registers to control 
the aggregate amount of maturity mismatch in the financial system. 
Many steps have been taken by the global authorities in response to the global 
financial crisis that erupted in 2007-2008 both to contain its impact and to prevent 
a recurrence.1 Arguably amongst the most fundamental changes are some of those 
yet to be implemented: the introduction of global liquidity regulation as part of 
Basel III, through the imposition of the ‘Liquidity Coverage Ratio’ or LCR and the 
‘Net Stable Funding Ratio’ or NSFR;2 and the recent proposals for oversight of 
shadow banking proposed by the Financial Stability Board.3   
These measures reflect the regulatory consensus that a major regulatory failing 
pre-crisis regulation was the failure to contain systemic liquidity risks. The LCR 
will require every bank to hold enough high quality liquidity assets to cope with a 
one-month stressed runoff. It will be gradually brought into effect between January 
2015 and January 2019. The NCFR will require every bank to have enough stable 
(long term) funding to fully finance its holdings of long term assets. It is due to 
come into force in January 2018, although this timetable is currently under review. 
The FSB proposes a range of further regulations aimed at containing risk posed by 
the potential loss of liquidity in repo markets, in money market mutual funds and 
other forms of short term funding markets outside of the formal regulated banking 
sector i.e. in ‘shadow banking’. 
These new regulations are both inconsistent and inefficient. They are 
inconsistent because they take a different approach to regulation of maturity 
_________________________ 
1 A partial list includes the major expansion of the balance sheets of the Federal Reserve, the ECB 
and the Bank of England and emergency provision of central bank liquidity against a range of 
collateral; US dollar swaps provided by the Federal Reserve to other central banks; the capital and 
liquidity requirements of Basel III (BCBS (2010a); additional oversight requirements on systemically 
important financial institutions; central registration and clearing of OTC derivative markets; the 
imposition of resolution plans to avoid future tax-payer bail-out of failing financial institutions; the 
creation of new ‘macroprudential’ policy making bodies and various forms of structural intervention 
including the US Volcker rule limiting commercial bank activities the UK ring fencing of retail 
banking and EU Liikanen proposals for ring fencing of trading. 
2 See BCBS (2010b, 2013). 
3 See Financial Stability Board (2012b). 
 www.economics-ejournal.org  2 
mismatch within and outside of the regulated banking sector, creating potential for 
new forms of regulatory arbitrage between regulated and ‘shadow’ banks. They 
are inefficient for two further reasons. They make the adjustment of individual 
balance sheets difficult and costly, inhibiting the trading of liquidity between 
individual institutions and so requiring the hold much more liquidity than is 
necessary to contain idosyncratic liquidity risks. They are inefficient also because 
of the complexity of the new rules adds to what is already a very heavy 
administrative compliance burden imposed post-crisis on all regulated financial 
institutions.  
The proposals of this paper are designed to achieve the same end – control of 
systemic liquidity and any consequent credit risk – but with a simpler, more 
effective and less burdensome regime. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
sets out the two elements of the proposal. The first is the register itself. 
Compliance is ensured by requiring that liabilities that are not recorded in this 
register can be postponed rather than repaid if the borrower does not wish to make 
repayment. The second element is a system of ‘cap and trade’ of registered short 
term liabilities. The government issues licenses for holding these liabilities. A 
penalty is imposed on financial institutions issuing registered short term liabilities 
not matched by the possession of a license. Licenses are tradable to ensure that 
liquidity – in the form of short term liabilities – is allocated to uses which earn the 
greatest return.  
Section 3 discusses the rationale for this proposal. Costs are small. It will be 
relatively low cost because the creation of a short-term liability register is 
something that will likely be needed anyway, in order to fulfil the commitment of 
policy makers and regulatory authorities to ensure that financial institutions 
issuing short-term liabilities can be resolved without tax-payer support. It also has 
relatively low compliance costs because of the flexibility offered by ‘cap and 
trade’ to individual institutions. Benefits are large. Using registration to support a 
system of cap and trade provides the regulatory authorities with a direct control 
over aggregate short-term funding and accompanying credit creation; and therefore 
prevents the possibility of monetary stimulus leading to unsustainable creation of 
money and credit. It is also a valuable complement to higher bank capital 
requirements, because it is more universal (it applies to non-banks as well as 
banks) and poses less risk of reducing the supply of sustainable and value creating 
credit.  
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Section 4 discusses some practical concerns and consequences of introducing 
this registration and licensing of short term liabilities. Can the register be avoided? 
Because the control is focus short term liabilities, not on control of assets, 
avoidance is difficult. Does it not require fundamental change the business models 
of both banks and long term investors? Yes but this change is desirable in itself 
with a shift from focus on short term to longer term returns. Section 5 discusses 
how the ideas of this paper relate to some other policy proposals. Section 6 offers 
some concluding remarks.  
2 The Proposed Mechanism 
It is a little surprising that – despite all the discussion of systemic risk following 
the global financial crisis – all the regulatory responses to the crisis have been 
focused on controlling the behaviour of individual institutions or the terms of 
individual contracts. Little or no attention has been paid to developing measures 
which allow individual institutions maximum freedom to take their own business 
decisions and meet customer needs, while still giving the regulatory authorities 
control over aggregate outcomes. 
This paper suggests a comprehensive registration of assets and liabilities, 
which can be used to monitor the extent of aggregate maturity mismatch and its 
contribution to systemic liquidity risks. This is in line with other current initiatives. 
Regulators are, increasingly, paying attention to the need for good quality data in 
order to contain systemic financial risk, an example being the requirements for 
registration of over the counter derivative positions in trade repositories, the 
development of a system of global legal entity identifiers for wholesale market 
participants and the establishment, in the US, of the Office of Financial Research 
with responsibility for the collection and analysis of data on systemic financial 
risk.4 
It also proposes a system of ‘cap and trade’ for controlling aggregate systemic 
liquidity risk, while providing individual institutions with maximum freedom to 
manage their own liquidity. This is conceptually simple and also has a further 
_________________________ 
4 See also De Soto (2012) who emphasises the fundamental role of information on ownership in 
control of system wide risks. 
 www.economics-ejournal.org  4 
merit, compared with the panoply of measures in Basel III, of asymmetry, 
discouraging any rapid expansion of funding and credit relative to existing levels 
while putting no pressure on institutions to contract their balance sheets. This 
could be a critical advantage, given the weak state of the global economy and the 
fear that reregulation threatens to lower credit supply and help create a renewed 
global economic downturn. 
These proposals can be implemented as follows.  
2.1 Registration 
• A central register of financial assets and liabilities is established, and 
updated in real time. All domestically held financial assets and liabilities 
must be included. For implementation of ‘cap and trade’ the detail on asset 
holdings can be sketchy (the main reason for including them is to ensure 
complete coverage of liabilities through the balance sheet identity) but full 
details must be provided on maturity and promised cash flows on each 
liability.  
• There must be incentives for accurate registration. The main incentive is a 
requirement that, in order for repayment of a short-term liability to be 
legally enforceable under domestic law, it must be contained in the 
register.5 If a short-term liability is not registered then it can be rolled over 
at a current market rate of interest. 
2.2 Cap and Trade 
• The systemic risk regulator (for example the Financial Policy Committee of 
the Bank of England in the case of the UK) determines on a quarterly basis 
an amount, say £100bn, as the upper limit on short term liabilities of 
financial intermediaries in the relevant currency. Licenses for this amount 
are distributed to financial institutions (an appropriate basic criteria for 
allocation is usage over a previous 3 month period, but a degree of re-
_________________________ 
5 See Stout (2009) for a related approach to derivative regulation, based on limited enforceability of 
contract. 
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allocation might be undertaken e.g. in order to achieve further goals such as 
promoting new entry into lending markets).  
• The short term liabilities of non-financial companies (trade credits, 
corporate paper, drawn down lines of credit from banks etc.) are included in 
the register but are not subject to licensing control. All short term liabilities 
used to finance financial investments, both loans and securities, are subject 
to licensing control. Also any offshore funding, whether short or long term, 
is subject to licensing control at the full rate. In offshore financial centres 
(including London) an exemption might be made for offshore foreign 
currency funding used to finance the holding of offshore foreign currency 
assets, or such exposures might be subject to separate licensing regimes. 
• The license requirements are netted off within the same balance sheet. So 
for example when £10mn of registered short term funding is used to hold 
£6mn of short term registered assets subject to licensing by their issuer, then 
this counts as only £4mn use of short term funding. 
• In advance of each quarterly period licenses are auctioned. One way this can 
be done is by requiring financial institutions to submit schedules for 
purchase or sale of licenses (relative to their initial allocation), stating how 
much they are willing to pay for acquiring licenses or what they would be 
willing to sell them for. Then a cut-off price can be established at which the 
supply of licenses sold equals the demand for licenses purchased, and 
schedules are exercised at prices up to and including this cut-off. 
• During the subsequent quarterly period short term liabilities (and all 
offshore liabilities) are measured and monitored on a end of working day 
basis; and, if at any time they exceed what is allowed by the licence, then a 
fine is due (the level of the fine should be large enough to provide a strong 
discouragement, but not preclude emergency borrowing; this might be 
perhaps 4 basis points per day, equivalent to an annual rate of interest of 
around 10 per cent.) These controls apply to all financial institutions – 
commercial banks, investment bank trading, market making and brokerage, 
hedge funds, and also investment institutions such as insurance companies 
and pension funds (although normally these will not borrow short term). 
They cover not just unsecured borrowing but also secured contracts such as 
repo. Licensing applies to retail deposits as well as to wholesale. 
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• Intra-quarter (daily) trading of licenses can be permitted to allow more 
efficient use of liquidity. 
• To allow for control of ‘near-money’ liabilities of relatively short maturity, 
the quantity of short term liabilities subject to licensing can be calculated on 
a ‘(365-t)/365’ basis where t is the residual maturity. An overnight liability 
(t=0) would have a full 100% weighting; and three month liability (t=91) 
would have a 75% weighting etc. All liabilities would however have to be 
included in the register, so that when the residual maturity of longer term 
liabilities falls to less than one year, they fall within the ambit of the 
licensing system. 
The control over the stock of licenses limits the amount of maturity mismatch 
in the entire financial system. A great advantage, relative to existing policy 
measures, is the asymmetry of this approach to regulation, discouraging rapid 
expansion of short term liabilities and credit, but (unlike the Basel III capital and 
liquidity requirements) creating no short or long term incentive to reduce short 
term liabilities and credit. An appropriate target is to limit total short term financial 
sector liabilities to a given ratio of nominal GDP. This target can be based on the 
average ratio of short term liabilities to GDP in the recent past. What is important 
is that the licensing prevents rapid increase in the ratio of short term liabilities to 
nominal GDP, and hence prevents the unsustainable build up of maturity mismatch 
in the system as a whole. 
3 The Rationale for Register, Cap and Trade 
The case for register and for cap and trade is straightforward. The benefits are 
clear. Registration is a fundamental for adequate control of systemic financial risks 
of all kinds. A cap and trade system would have prevented much of the build of 
the key sources of systemic credit and liquidity crisis during the global crisis: both 
the large expansion of US mortgage backed securities and other structured credit 
instruments, financed using short term funding in short term money markets such 
as repo and ABCP; and the large scale use of short term money market funding by 
banks in periphery Europe. Moreover the costs of implementation are small 
(especially when compared to other alternative regulatory measures). 
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3.1 Registration is a Necessity 
Asset and liability registers will be needed for several aspects of post-crisis 
regulation, especially the practical execution of the ‘resolution plans’ regulators 
are now requiring of all major financial firms. Rapid identification of claimants is 
an essential requirement for orderly resolution, i.e. allocation of losses and 
continuity of services, when a bank or trading firm is in financial distress and this 
identification needs a complete register of liabilities. The mechanics of dealing 
with a bank resolution are well understood, at least for the case of small 
institutions with relatively simple structure.6 It is necessary, if immediate 
liquidation is to be avoided, to have a special resolution regime distinct to that 
applied to non-financial corporations.7 For large complex institutions, especially 
those active across borders, resolution is more complex. In this difficult case, an 
asset liability register is of great value, for example quickly allowing the 
authorities to determine the extent which other institutions are exposed to the 
institution in trouble.  
3.2 Cap and Trade Can Help Restrain Credit Booms 
The build-up to the recent financial crisis, like most others, was characterised by 
rapid expansion of credit, financed by short term funding and increasing maturity 
mismatch. Such credit booms cannot be easily controlled using traditional 
monetary policy instruments – based on the control over short and (most recently) 
long term interest rates. The central bank has a considerable influence over interest 
rates, both short and long term, from its power to create monetary liabilities (via 
open market operations, repo and reverse repo lending, and purchase of long term 
assets). But aggregate money and credit is determined by the credit decisions of 
commercial banks and other financial institutions and these decisions depend on 
_________________________ 
6 The research and publications of the International Association of Deposit Insurers  
http://www.iadi.org/ contain much standard information. 
7 In contrast to a non-financial corporation, it is not possible to impose a stay on creditors; the usual 
route for maintaining a troubled company as an active concern. Doing this would require a freeze on 
all deposits, effectively putting a bank out of business. 
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many other factors, including business confidence and expectations of future 
interest rates and inflation.  
This lack of control of central banks over monetary and credit aggregates is a 
key source of systemic financial risk.8 The decision in good times by individual 
banks and other lenders to increase credit and money exposes the financial system 
as a whole to disruption when market participants lose confidence in the value of 
underlying assets. This disruption is especially pronounced when this lending is 
financed using short term liabilities (maturity mismatch); 9 and in particular when 
maturity mismatch is created by borrowing using short term wholesale funding 
instruments, such as repo or interbank borrowing rather than retail funding (short 
term retail funding is relatively sticky and only ‘runs’ when severely provoked).10 
Wholesale funding is subject to the threat of a collapse of confidence such as 
undermined interbank, repo and money markets during the 2007 to 2009 crisis.11 
‘Cap and trade’, by imposing a constraint on the creation of deposits and other 
short term quasi-money, provides a direct mechanism of control, preventing the 
emergence of such vulnerabilities.  
One way of understanding this systemic risk is as an economic externality. The 
returns demanded on short term liabilities, insured or uninsured, do not fully 
reflect the risk that underlying assets may not fully repay these liabilities. This 
understatement of risk is especially pronounced in credit booms and underpins the 
growth of shadow banking that contributed substantially to the build of risk prior 
to 2007.12 The externality is accentuated by ‘firesales’, the pressure on illiquid 
_________________________ 
8 The autonomous creation of bank money and credit is the essential mechanism in Von Mises 
theory of the business cycle (Von Mises (1981)); the inability of the central bank to control the 
money supply is also a key element the criticism of monetarism of Kaldor (1970); for more extended 
recent discussion see Collins et. al. (2011).  
9 See Besar et. al. (2011) for a detailed and extended analysis of the sources of systemic financial 
risk, including maturity mismatch. 
10 A good illustration is the run on UK bank Northern Rock in September 2007, which was 
essentially a wholesale not a retail run (for a full description see Milne and Wood (2009) and Shin 
(2009)). 
11 See for example Brunnermeier (2009) and Milne (2009). 
12 Tarullo (2012: 3) describes the role of shadow banking well: ‘Shadow banking also refers to the 
creation of assets that are thought to be safe, short-term, and liquid, and as such, cash equivalents 
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institutions especially those with relatively high leverage and maturity mismatch to 
sell assets in order repay short term liabilities, leading to substantial credit losses 
and sharp declines in mark to market valuations, so further undermining 
confidence.13  
By analogy with environmental externalities such as acid rain and greenhouse 
gases, this systemic risk can be controlled by setting aggregate emission limits (the 
license cap) and allowing exchange between institutions (the trade of licenses) to 
determine the most efficient allocation between institutions. The analogy is not 
exact. Not every single dollar of short term liabilities can be expected to make 
exactly the same contribution to systemic financial risk, the contribution will vary 
with the liquidity of underlying assets and with the stability as well as the maturity 
of liabilities. But cap and trade still limits the amount of short term funding to 
finance holdings of financial assets and will, in particular, prevent large scale 
increases in maturity mismatch which trigger systemic problems when the value 
and liquidity of underlying assets is called into question. 
3.3 Cap and Trade is a Valuable Complement to Other Prudential 
Instruments  
‘Cap and trade’ deals with potential weaknesses of other prudential instruments, 
notably capital regulation or lending controls. The incentives for shareholders to 
exploit the financial safety net (bank ‘moral hazard’) and the resulting possibility 
of systemic crisis could be dramatically reduced simply by requiring banks to hold 
sufficiently high levels of capital. By avoiding any concern about underlying 
solvency, any ‘firesale externality’ from forced asset sales and thus any resulting 
liquidity risk would not arise. In short, it can be argued that a sufficient level of 
equity capital will make all forms of debt finance, short or long term, entirely safe 
and make liquidity regulation redundant.  
This reasoning is however weak because it does not take account of limitations 
of higher capital requirements. Most obviously, higher capital requirements apply 
_________________________ 
similar to insured deposits in the commercial banking system. Of course, as many financial market 
actors learned to their dismay, in periods of stress these assets are not the same as insured deposits.’ 
13 There is an extensive technical academic literature on such firesale externalities, see for example 
Stein (2011), Kashyap and Stein (2012) and Korinek (2012). 
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only to banks and so may lead to intermediation moving out of the regulated 
banking sector into ‘shadow banking’. Cap and trade avoids this problem by 
imposing the same prudential control over both shadow and regulated banks.  
But perhaps the more crucial limitation of higher capital requirements is that 
this may lead to unwanted short-term reduction in the supply bank lending, 
especially when the economy is weak. While an increase in capital ratios has no 
long term resource cost, the adjustment to higher capital requirements is difficult, 
especially when loan performance is poor and when banks are still absorbing past 
losses, and when shareholders do not trust that managers will operate banks in the 
interests of shareholders (the familiar ‘agency cost of equity’ discussed in the 
corporate finance literature). 
This is a crucial advantage of cap and trade. In present circumstances, when 
the economic and financial problems facing the global economy, notably the 
challenge of controlling fiscal deficits in the industrialised countries and the 
continuing problems of debt overhang in the periphery of the Euro area there is a 
real danger of regulatory pro-cyclicality making matters worse. Higher capital and 
liquidity requirements are creating balance sheet pressures on banks that lead to a 
shortage of credit and a direct reduction of global economic activity, all this at a 
time when global economic output is already weak. Better therefore to have 
greater flexibility in capital requirements (perhaps by making use of the Basel 
‘conservation buffer’ and/ or extending the timetable for compliance) and 
accompanying them with a regime of ‘cap and trade’. Cap and trade will also 
reduce concerns that monetary stimulus will lead to rapidly rising inflation, and 
hence make it easier for monetary authorities to employ sufficient stimulus to 
avoid a global shortage of aggregate demand. 
3.4 Cap and Trade is Less Costly than Basel III Liquidity Proposals 
Cap and trade is a relatively low cost form of liquidity regulation for two reasons: 
first it allows liquidity to be exchanged between firms and allocated where it is 
obtains the highest return; second it can be calibrated to discourage unstable 
increases of maturity mismatch without, at the same time, requiring costly change 
in financial structure. 
Unlike Basel III liquidity requirements gives firms flexibility in their business 
decisions. Individual institutions can choose for themselves an appropriate balance 
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of short- and long-term funding and to cope relatively easily with short term 
difficulties in issuing of long-term debt.14 An example of the low costs of ‘cap and 
trade’ relative to Basel III liquidity measures are the difficulties posed by the LCR 
for French banks. An important source of funding for French banks are retail 
money market mutuals (often sponsored by the banks themselves to obtain the tax 
benefits to the ‘livre A’ category of funds). This funding is treated by Basel III as 
short term that can be withdrawn within one month and therefore be matched by 
liquid assets. But the resulting requirement to hold liquid and therefore low yield 
assets against customer funds imposes a higher cost on French banks than on those 
in other countries. The netting of licensing requirements under cap and trade gets 
around this difficulty. This is a general property of cap and trade, by focusing on 
the aggregate maturity mismatch it minimises interference in individual firm 
decisions. 
There are concerns that Basel III liquidity requirements, similar to those 
voiced about Basel III capital requirements, will lead to an undesirable contraction 
in the supply of bank credit. This is why the timescale of implementation of the 
Basel liquidity regulations has recently been extended.15 A advantage of having 
‘cap and trade’ alongside higher regulatory capital requirements is that it can be 
introduced immediately with a sufficiently high level of licenses to ensure there is 
no restriction on the current use of short term funding, while still being effective at 
preventing future unsustainable increase of money and credit. 
4 Practical Concerns and Business Impact 
This section addresses concerns about the practical implementation and business 
impact of the liability register and its use for cap and trade. 
  
_________________________ 
14 For more detailed assessment of the liquidity and capital requirements in Basel III, see Allen et. 
al. (2012). 
15 See BCBS (2013). 
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4.1 Will the System Work?  
Several practical objections can be raised. Will cap and trade encourage a ‘black 
market’ where firms obtain short and long term debt in order to avoid licensing 
restrictions? Will clever financial engineers not move assets and liabilities ‘off 
balance sheet’ so that they escape the discipline of the licenses? Will banking and 
other activities not move overseas to other jurisdictions (if the licensing is not 
applied on a global basis)?  
Even if the system is effective, will it not impose unnecessary costs? Will the 
costs of registration not prove to be prohibitive? Would it in effect operate like a 
system of capital controls, preventing the free international flow of capital and 
hence reduce the available funds for productive investment opportunities. At the 
domestic level would it not increase funding costs and hence limit the supply of 
credit. Would it not also create barriers to entry and so reduce competition in the 
financial system, with some firms unfairly benefiting, at the expense of others, 
from the distribution of licenses? Is ‘cap and trade’ really necessary to correctly 
aligning private sector incentives, can this not be achieved simply by imposing 
very high capital requirements? Finally it might be objected that ‘cap and trade’, 
far from promoting financial stability, could result in large fluctuations in the cost 
of funding and might even trigger instability if it triggered a withdrawal of 
deposits from institutions close to exhausting their licensing capacity. 
Scepticism towards cap and trade is understandable. It’s application in the 
European Union has not worked especially well as a tool for containing carbon 
emissions (although it has worked well for controlling US acid rain emissions, see 
Enironmental Protection Agency (2003)), being weakened by partial coverage, for 
example not extending to automobile or aviation fuels and the opportunity for 
companies to reduce their need for licenses by transferring production outside of 
the EU and then sell unneeded licenses. There is also a further criticism that the 
‘caps’ in environmental cap and trade have sometimes been insufficiently 
restrictive, allowing too high a level of continued emissions. Maybe so, but this 
reflects scientific uncertainties and the response of policy makers to the relatively 
high costs of altering production technologies; it is not a criticism of the 
effectiveness of cap and trade per se. 
A further reason for scepticism is that there have been previous unsuccessful 
attempts at using rationing systems or other direct control over bank balance 
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sheets, notably the attempt in the UK in the early 1970s, under the regime of 
‘competition and credit control’ to impose restrictions on the expansion of bank 
credit known as the corset. These arrangements were a response to the erosion of 
traditional institutional arrangements, in turn weakening the influence of the Bank 
of England over the growth of domestic money and credit. Increasingly the 
London clearing banks were learning to turn to the London wholesale funding 
markets as a source of marginal finance, allowing them to expand or contract their 
balance sheets independently of the guidance and monetary operations of the Bank 
of England.  
The corset attempted to impose controls on the growth of lending of individual 
institutions. It failed because where there was demand, credit grew regardless of 
the presence of the corset, supplied off balance sheet or by non-banks (‘shadow 
banks’) funding themselves in wholesale markets. Cap and trade of maturity 
mismatch is however not subject to the same weakness, because it does not aim to 
directly control aggregate credit creation. Yes, short term funding can still be 
provided ‘off register’, but the providers of this funding will be aware that, in the 
event of a crisis, their short term claims will be postponed until liquidity problems 
have been resolved. Therefore borrowers cannot be forced to sell assets at low 
‘firesale’ prices because of the withdrawal of this funding and, if firms fail, these 
shorter lenders will expect to be in the same position as any other creditor with a 
claim in a bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, provided that they do not expect to be 
bailed out by government, these funders will require to be compensated according 
their perception of the long term risk of losses on the underlying assets. 
What about the costs of registration? Registration of asset and liabilities is 
something that is will eventually be required of the industry, in order to fulfil the 
authorities’ objective of ensuring that all firms are resolvable.16 Such registration 
is already well advanced in relation to over the counter derivative markets. It is 
only a matter of time before similar developments occur for short term funding and 
other markets. 
Yes registration is a substantial practical challenge and it could take some time 
to agree on such standards and get the asset and liability register up and running.17 
_________________________ 
16 The latest statement of this from the global authorities is Financial Stability Board (2012). 
17 One comparison is with the European Central Bank’s ‘Target 2 securities’ (T2S) system for pan-
European settlement of securities trades. This is a central register that mirrors the positions of 
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There would have to be extensive testing to ensure that system is operationally 
sound, but these operational challenges can be dealt with over time. 
What about the possibility of financial engineering that replicates short term 
funding, outside of the register, hence undermining the effectiveness of the cap? 
Again this does not undermine the ‘cap and trade’ of short term funding, provided 
unregistered claims are not legally enforceable. Such claims might be created but 
they cannot create a destabilising run because a borrower can always refuse 
immediate repayment. 
Another potential weakness is ‘offshoring’. Will the response not be the same 
for example as to the imposition of ‘Regulation Q’ constraints on US dollar rates 
of interest in the 1960s, with business migrating to other financial centres where 
there is no requirement for licensing? Indeed yes, there could be large scale short-
term offshore funding, booked in a foreign jurisdiction, of domestic assets. This 
was a feature of the crisis of 2007-2008 because many US dollar structured 
securities, backed by US domestic assets, were held and financed using dollar 
financing in overseas jurisdictions (for documentation of the extent of these 
exposures see McCauley et. al. (2010)) and this in turn forced the Federal Reserve 
to provide dollar swaps to central banks around the world, so that they in turn 
could provide the necessary liquidity support for these dollar exposures. Such 
positions would be an avoidance of ‘cap and trade’ funding restrictions, if both 
assets and funding move to foreign jurisdictions where register, cap and trade is 
not applied. 
Although such avoidance can occur, if register, cap and trade is applied in 
some jurisdictions but not others, this does not undermine its effectiven2ss. 
Avoidance of this kind also removes systemic liquidity risks from domestic 
institutions, transferring it instead to institutions in other jurisdictions. This means 
that register, cap and trade is still effective in reducing the systemic liquidity risk 
exposure of domestic institutions.  
What about the extension of domestic trade credit, e.g. when a large customer 
borrows from a supplier by making payment after delivery of a goods and services, 
or a large supplier borrows from a customer, by insisting on payment before 
delivery of a goods and services? In principal these short term liabilities could also 
_________________________ 
individual national depositories through overnight uploading of liability (security account) data. 
Getting T2S up and running has been a multi-year project. But T2S is a greater challenge than the 
asset liability register, because of the need to implement real time delivery against payment (DVP). 
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be brought within the scope of the licensing scheme. As a practical matter it seems 
easier if they are excluded, but trade credit should still be recorded in the asset 
liability register, so that if the firm begins to use trade credit to engage in financial 
intermediation the licensing requirements can then be applied to its activities. 
Similarly the short-term liabilities of companies to financial institutions are best 
recorded but not subject to license.    
It might be thought that derivative or off-balance sheet contracts could 
replicate short term funding and undermine the system. For example, derivative 
contracts which are economically similar to short term deposit claims, such as an 
‘in the money’ call option for purchase at a fixed exercise price of low risk assets 
such as short term government bonds. The existence of such derivative contracts 
does not undermine ‘cap and trade’ because, without registration, they are not 
legally enforceable short term obligations.  
A natural concern is that such ‘cap and trade’ could end up operating like a 
system of exchange controls, preventing the free international flow of capital and 
hence reduce the available funds for productive investment opportunities. This is 
not the case. While under cap and trade UK based subsidiaries could not lend to or 
borrow from non-UK institutions, except at maturities of well over 12 months, 
such business can be conducted by non-UK subsidiaries and UK institutions can 
freely make outright purchases or sales of foreign currency, with any entity 
worldwide. Moreover non-UK institutions can still establish subsidiaries in the UK 
to conduct short-term sterling transactions, so there is free entry of overseas 
institutions into short term money markets. 
Another concern is that could create barriers to entry and so reduce 
competition in the financial sector, especially in deposit markets. This depends on 
the allocation of licenses. If licenses are given only to existing incumbents, then 
competition is indeed reduced. But the distribution of licenses can also be used, for 
example, to encourage new entry in customer deposit markets. It therefore may be 
appropriate to involve the competition authorities in the process for allocation of 
licenses. 
Finally it might be objected that ‘cap and trade’, far from promoting financial 
stability, could result in large fluctuations in the cost of funding and might even 
trigger instability if it triggered a withdrawal of deposits from institutions close to 
exhausting their licensing capacity. But this depends on the volume of available 
licenses. It could induce such instability if the stock of available licenses were 
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contracted sharply during periods of financial vulnerability. But if used 
appropriately, to constrain excessive build up of maturity mismatch (excessive that 
is relative to the level of nominal GDP) when credit and financial institution 
balance sheets are growing strongly, then it will reduce exposure to systemic 
liquidity risk; and in the event of an episode of financial instability the volume of 
licenses can be increased to support access to short term funding.  
4.2 Business Impact 
The most vociferous objections to ‘register, cap and trade’ can be expected from 
financial institutions themselves. This policy will have a substantial impact on 
their business models, especially for those banks, hedge funds and other 
institutions that use short term funding to take positions in security and foreign 
exchange markets. Financial firms have come to rely on their access short term 
and low cost funding, in order to take advantage of short term profit opportunities. 
A shift to using long term debt and equity to finance their holdings increases costs 
of position taking and greatly limit the activity of market makers and dealers as 
well as of proprietary traders.  
A foreign exchange dealer, for example, who wished to borrow in sterling in 
order to exchange spot for dollars, would require a liquidity license. If ‘cap and 
trade’ was introduced unilaterally by the UK, this would raise the cost of short 
term funding and thus (via covered interest parity) affect the relationship between 
spot and future exchange rates. Holding long positions in securities would 
similarly become more expensive. And so too would holding short positions, since 
the borrowing of securities, in order to hold a short position, is always matched by 
a counterparty on the other side of the trade who borrows money and providing the 
security as collateral. The borrowing of the counterparty would be subject to cap 
and trade licensing and thus security borrowing would become relatively 
expensive. 
Financial market participants are ever inventive and will no doubt find ways to 
continue taking positions, despite cap and trade on short term borrowing. For 
example it should be possible to borrow securities using other securities rather 
than cash as collateral. The secondary trading of licenses can be expected to 
become highly sophisticated, with the market price of licenses fluctuating 
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substantially day to day, hour to hour and minute to minute. So there will continue 
to be short term position taking.  
But ‘cap and trade’ will bite on financial trading. Aggregate short term inflows 
into security markets no longer be automatically financed by collateralised short 
term credit; instead investors will have to compete with traditional banks for a 
limited pool of available short term funds from retail and corporate customers.18 
With investment flows between money and security markets damped, it is likely 
that security and foreign exchange prices will become less volatile and less 
cyclical.19 This in itself seems a desirable outcome, helping prices match more 
closely to economic fundamentals and more than offsetting the somewhat higher 
costs of transactions for final investors (such as insurance companies and pension 
funds).  
There is a parallel with the widely discussed proposal by Tobin (1978) for a 
tax on foreign exchange transactions, a proposal that has since been frequently 
revived for a range of financial markets as a means of discouraging trading that 
aims only at achieving short term returns. The current proposals by the European 
Commission for a financial transactions tax are motivated by a desire to both 
discourage short term trading and to force the financial sector to make an increased 
contribution to public sector revenues, but as is well known they will be easily 
evaded and thus yield little revenue and have only limited impact on market 
pricing and behaviour. 
‘Cap and trade’ will have a similar impact on short term position taking as a 
Tobin tax, but can do so in a more cost efficient manner, since it imposes no direct 
cost on long investors such as pension, insurance or sovereign wealth funds that 
seek to alter their portfolios. There will of course be an indirect impact. Less short 
term financing of trading positions will lead to some reduction in price discovery, 
with current market prices reflecting the views of rather fewer market participants. 
But market participants will be limited in their ability to use short term funds to 
make profitable trades based on anticipating short term price movements (a desire 
_________________________ 
18 Adrian and Shin (2009) document of the large cyclical variation in repo by New York broker 
dealers. 
19 See Adrian et. al. (2010) for evidence that fluctuations in repo borrowing in New York markets 
are associated with fluctuations of exchange rates, implying that ‘cap and trade’ would reduce 
exchange rate volatility. 
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to borrow money to go long, or go short and deposit money, will be largely 
reflected in an increase in the prices of licenses for short term funding, rather than 
in fluctuations in the market price of securities). So market prices will 
approximately more closely to expected long-run fundamentals. 
There will be a similarly major impact on asset management firms who will no 
longer be able to easily move client portfolios out of securities into cash, or from 
cash into securities. Portfolio decisions will have to be based much more clearly 
on their assessment of long-run returns. These are major change of business model 
for both trading and investment firms, but the resulting focus on long term 
investment returns appear to be a substantial additional benefit from cap and trade 
(especially if this shifts market equilibrium from an impatient to patient outcome 
as described by Haldane (2009)). 
5 Related Ideas and Policy Initiatives 
This section reviews some related ideas – under four broad headings (i) measures 
to increase transparency and availability of data for the financial sector; (ii) the 
new ‘macroprudential’ approach to regulation emphasising containment of 
systemic financial risk; (iii) the imposition of Pigovian taxes to contain systemic 
risk externalities; (iv) structural reforms and intervention in the financial sector. 
5.1 Measures to Increase Transparency and Data Availability 
One of the most notable regulatory developments since the global financial crisis 
has been steps taken by the regulatory authorities in both the US and Europe to 
ensure much greater transparency and availability of data, especially in over the 
counter (OTC) derivative markets. Both the Dodd-Frank act and also forthcoming 
European regulation are requiring trades in OTC markets to be recorded in central 
trade repositories, both in order to provide regulators with up to date information 
on market developments and also to allow market participants to better assess the 
financial condition of their market counterparties. 
A central component of these new requirements will be the establishment of a 
global system for unique legal entity identification (or LEI) system, which allows 
unambiguous identification of every participant in a contract between financial 
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firms.20 While the global system is still under discussion, the Commodity and 
Futures Trading Commmission in the US derivatives regulator is pioneering a 
system of interim compliant identifiers, in order to fulfil its obligation under the 
Dodd-Frank act to begin tracking swap transactions in 2012. Eventually all OTC 
derivatives transactions should be fully recorded in trade repositories and where 
possible cleared through central counterparties. 
While the initial efforts of regulators have been focussed on derivatives, 
especially on interest rate swaps and credit default swaps, a similar shift to 
recording and monitoring of transactions can be expected in short term money 
markets, including repo, in order to allow the regulators to monitor risks to the 
system as a whole and also to track exposures when a firm has to be resolved. The 
liabilities register similar to that proposed in this paper will be a necessary step to 
provide such transparency in short term money markets. 
5.2 New Regulations to Contain Systemic Financial Risk 
The failure of regulators to anticipate and respond to systemic financial risk is now 
widely acknowledged.21 Efforts are now being devoted to modeling and 
measuring such systemic risk externalities;22 and policy makers have been 
introducing regulatory measures intended to address them, including the likely 
introduction of ‘cyclically varying’ bank capital charges and other macroprudential 
tools.   
Using cap and trade to address systemic risk from maturity mismatch provides 
a further potentially useful macroprudential instrument. Since cap and trade 
focuses on preventing further increase in maturity mismatch, rather than the total 
amount of maturity mismatch, there is no need to determine a correct level of short 
term financing, either for the industry as a whole or for individual firms. Cap and 
trade can then be used to put pressure on the system as a whole to refinance at 
longer maturities, by reducing the stock of available licenses. But this can be done 
gradually and adjustment can be made most by those firms that have the credibility 
_________________________ 
20 See Financial Stability Board (2012a). 
21 Turner (2009), Brunnermeier et. al. (2009). 
22 For example Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009). 
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with investors that allows them to raise long term funding at low cost (other firms 
will instead pay the additional costs of obtaining licenses that allow them to 
continuing to using short term funding.)  
A different approach to the containment of systemic financial risk is motivated 
by a view of the financial system as a ‘complex adaptive system’ in which, in a 
stressed situation, shocks can cascade and amplify through the network of 
connections between firms.23 This is one motivation for the creation of new 
macroprudential policy making bodies that can both respond to increasing 
financial systemic risks and ensure that financial systems are resilient and do not 
break down when these risks materialise. But there is concern that the actions of 
these new macroprudential policy making bodies will create uncertainty for both 
financial institutions and non-financial businesses about the cost and availability of 
credit and hence interfere with economic activity.24  
There is therefore a strong case for arguing that macroprudential tools should 
be used within a strict rule based framework, in which the impact on the cost and 
availability of credit can be readily predicted. Cap and trade provides an example 
of how such a rule based macroprudential policy instrument can work, with the 
aggregate maturity mismatch constrained to grow no faster than a target level 
established by the authorities. Similar rule based aggregate rules could well be 
developed for containing aggregate financial sector capitalisation or other primary 
causes of systemic financial risk. 
5.3 Pigovian Taxes 
Another widely canvassed idea for making banking safer and limit state subsidy of 
risk taking is to impose ‘Pigovian’ taxes, designed so that individual firms end up 
paying for the additional ‘externality’ created when their decisions impose risks on 
other firms and the financial system as a whole. This idea has been taken up in 
_________________________ 
23 See Haldane (2009) for an overview. 
24 See Clark and Large (2011) for a discussion of the many challenges to faced in establishing an 
effective macroprudential policy function. 
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several recent contributions to the debate on regulatory policy.25 ‘Cap and trade’ 
can be seen as one way of implementing such a Pigovian tax.  
The contributions closest to the ‘cap and trade’ licensing of this paper are those 
of Perotti and Suarez (2009a, 2009b) and Stein (2010). Perotti and Suarez also 
focus on the systemic risk posed by maturity mismatch, and propose addressing 
this using a Pigovian tax on short term whole sale funding, aimed at preventing 
build-up of systemic risk from maturity match. ‘Cap and trade’ offers one clear 
advantages over the direct imposition of a Pigovian tax, it is no longer necessary to 
quantify the external costs of maturity mismatch, in order to determine the level of 
the tax. Rather instead aggregate maturity mismatch is directly controlled. Still the 
distinction between the two policies is not a sharp one: provided that system wide 
maturity mismatch is measured, then this can be controlled either directly using 
cap and trade or indirectly by setting an appropriate level of Pigovian tax. 
Perotti and Suarez (2010) consider a related issue whether such build up is best 
addressed using taxation or quantity controls, showing that when firms face 
differing investment opportunities a Pigovian tax is superior to a control of 
individual short term liabilities (this is because it is more flexible, it does not 
prevent firms creating value from using short term funding). This same flexibility 
benefit applies to ‘cap and trade’. Korinek (2012) provides a theoretical argument 
for imposition of such Pigovian taxes and also finds, in the context of his stylised 
model, that the same control of firesale externalities can be achieved through 
capital requirements. 
The most closely related proposal to the cap and trade suggested in this paper 
is that of Stein (2011), building on ideas put forward earlier by Kashyap and Stein 
(2004). Stein provides a theoretical argument in favour of ‘cap and trade’, 
developing a model of money creation, in which short term funding creates 
systemic risk externalities, because of potential firesales of assets. In this context 
‘cap and trade’ is the an effective way of incentivising banks to pursue socially 
desirable combination of investment levels and maturity composition of funding. 
_________________________ 
25 Including Brunnermeier et. al. (2009), Acharya et. al. (2010), Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009), 
Doluca et. al. (2010), Kocherlakota (2010), Jeanne and Korinek (2010), Shin (2010) and Markose 
(2012). Note that amongst these papers there are considerable differences of view about what 
constitutes a contribution to systemic risk. 
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However, Stein offers little discussion of practical implementation or any 
comparison with other policies for containing systemic risk. 
Kashyap and Stein (2012) consider how such a ‘cap and trade’ system might 
be put into practice, arguing that the systemic risk externality associated with short 
term borrowing could be addressed using the relatively old fashioned tool of 
setting binding low interest rate reserve requirements on all short term liabilities 
(one feature of their proposals is that they allow the authorities to independently 
alter both the level and interest paid on these reserves). Is this not equivalent to 
‘cap and trade’? There are parallels and differences. The parallel is that both the 
‘cap and trade’ of licenses and of required reserves would penalises the use of 
short term funding relative to long term funding and hence attenuate the systemic 
risk externality of maturity mismatch.  
However the proposal of Kashyap and Stein (2012) for ‘cap and trade’, based 
on reserve requirements, would weaken the ability of the central bank to control 
short term market rates of interest. Kashyap and Stein (2012) argue that the central 
bank can assert control over both the quantity and the price of reserves by altering 
the remuneration paid on reserves. This appears to be true in their theoretical 
model, but in practice banks experience substantial day to day fluctuations in 
reserves (for example as a consequence of movements of funds in foreign 
exchanges markets or large tax payments to government) and central banks have to 
respond by withdrawing or supply reserves in large quantities (typically using repo 
to lend reserves or reverse repo to withdraw reserves) so as to correct any 
imbalances in the market. If they do not do so the consequences are massive 
fluctuations of overnight money market interest rates such as the Fed Funds rate.26 
This means that, even if reserves are remunerated, it is impossible for the central 
bank to simultaneously control both their quantity and their price (an exception is 
when as now central banks expand reserves massively in excess of reserve 
requirements, then they can control both price and quantity, but this means they 
cannot use reserves as a constraint on bank decision making). Having, as proposed 
in this paper, separate traded licences for maturity mismatch allows the authorities 
to control both interest rates and maturity mismatch. 
_________________________ 
26 As occurred during the period 1979-1982 during the brief experiment by the Federal Reserve with 
monetary base control. 
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5.4 Structural Reform of the Banking Sector 
The cap and trade proposals of this paper seek to limit the extent to which risky 
credit expansion is financed using short term liabilities. There have been a number 
of proposals for radical structural reform of the banking industry over the years 
with similar aims. The literature on so-called ‘narrow banking’ in which banks 
would be forced to back deposits only by extremely safe assets such as central 
bank reserves or short-term government bonds, and deposits could not be used to 
finance lending, is long standing.27 The difference is that ‘cap and trade’ focuses 
on increases in the stock of money and credit, and does not attempt to change the 
funding of existing bank loans and other credit assets.  
There has been a related recent debate on structural reform in the UK, 
beginning with Kay (2009) who argues that there should be a clear separation of 
safe utility banks that take retail deposits from other financial institutions (though 
a banking group might contain a utility banking subsidiary alongside other riskier 
activities). Thus retail depositors are not exposed to the riskier aspects of banking 
and tax-payer protection of deposits, through explicit or implicit deposit insurance, 
does not subsidise risk-taking. Kay also argues that the ring-fencing of UK 
banking will help overcome problems of business culture, in which UK retail 
banks have been influenced by the aggressive nature of wholesale and investment 
banking and become excessively focussed on short term revenue growth at the 
expense of customer service and customer satisfaction. 
In May 2010 the newly elected coalition government in the UK established the 
independent commission on banking chaired by Sir John Vickers to look at the 
structural reform. It has recommended, in its final report of September 2011, a 
_________________________ 
27 The concept of narrow banking originated with the ‘Chicago Plan’, an idea that emerged in the 
Chicago economics faculty in the 1920s and 1930s that bank deposits should be fully backed by 
central bank reserves, not used for financing loans or other private sector liabilities. Henry Simons 
played a key role in formulating these ideas (for his subsequent exposition see Simons (1948)) and it 
was endorsed by many economists at the time including Frank Knight (Knight (1933)) and Irving 
Fisher (Fisher (1935)) and actively discussed with the Roosevelt administration. This idea was 
subsequently endorsed by many other influential economists including Maurice Allais (1948) and 
Milton Friedman (1960). These proposals for narrow banking were revived in a slightly different 
form, following the US S&L crisis, by Litan (1987), Tobin (1987), Spong (1989), and Burnham 
(1991). Phillips (1991, 1994) provides useful review of the intellectual history. Benes and Kumhof 
(2012) analyse from a modern perspective. 
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ring-fencing of UK retail banks, in which all customer deposit taking and short 
term customer lending must take place in separately capitalised ring-fenced 
subsidiaries.28 The UK government has accepted these proposals and is due to put 
them into law by early 2013 with implementation by 2018. However, while the 
separation of retail deposits and short-term lending into separate ‘ring-fenced’ 
subsidiaries is straightforward, the determination of what other activities should be 
inside and outside the ringfence has proved problematic, with a complex set of 
rules about what other exposure are legitimate for ring-fenced banks emerging. In 
the EU the Liikanen commission (Liikanen (2012)) has proposed a different form 
of ring-fencing, separating trading activities from other banking activities, 
although it is not yet certain to what extent these proposals will be implemented. 
UK and European developments are, to a degree, paralleled in the US, where 
the proposals of former Federal Reserve Governor Paul Volcker for limiting the 
engagement of licensed deposit taking banks in relatively risky activities of 
proprietary trading or participation in hedge funds and private equity funds have 
been incorporated as part of the 2010 US Dodd-Frank Act). Again however these 
are proving difficult to implement in practice, with lengthy rule books required in 
order to distinguish legitimate activities that can be conducted by commercial 
banks from those that cannot.  
A weakness of the Kay version of narrow banking, and its implementation as 
proposed by the UK Independent Commission on Banking, is that it places no 
constraints on the use of maturity mismatch by other financial institutions, those 
that do not take retail deposits. Other institutions (those whose funding comes 
from wholesale markets rather than retail deposits) could still use short term 
funding to expand their balance sheets, without being subject to the normal 
disciplines imposed when firms raise long term debt or equity finance. The 
combination of maturity mismatch and uncontrolled balance sheet expansion could 
then still pose a potentially large systemic risk, with a loss of confidence and 
withdrawal of funds leading to major declines in asset valuations and a significant 
loss of net worth across much of the financial sector. Some form of ‘cap and trade’ 
therefore still seems to be needed to contain the growth of such ‘shadow banking’. 
_________________________ 
28 The final report has been published at  
http://bankingcommission.independent.gov.uk/bankingcommission/ . 
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Kotlikoff (2010) offers a more ambitious structural reform that he labels 
‘limited purpose banking’, in which all bank liabilities would have to take the form 
of mutual fund claims on underlying assets. Transaction services could only be 
offered by cash mutuals, holding government issued money (central bank 
liabilities such as notes, but also central bank reserves). These cash mutuals are 
thus very much like the banks envisaged in the Chicago plan, but these ‘narrow’ 
banks are only part of Kotlikoff reform proposals. Safe investments, offering 
similar balance of risk and return as the savings or time deposits offered by today’s 
banks, can be provided by mutual funds as long as they invest only in safe short 
and medium term bonds, such as government and good quality corporate issuers. 
Higher returns could be offered by funds investing in longer term and riskier 
bonds or in equities. Limited purpose banking would eliminate all forms of 
maturity mismatch, rather than as in ‘cap and trade’ limiting its growth. 
Register, cap and trade can be seen as a variation on all these ideas, in that it is 
also a form of structural intervention. But it is designed to be relatively low cost to 
implement and to affect funding and credit decisions at the margin, not to impact 
on the outstanding stock of bank assets and existing funding arrangements. 
6 Concluding Remarks 
Current proposals from the Basel Committee (the LCR and NSFR of Basel III) and 
the Financial Stability Board (for regulation of shadow banking) are amongst the 
most important elements of post-crisis regulation, forming the primary safeguard 
against the re-emergence of systemic liquidity risk. But they are also complex and 
– like much of the post-crisis reregulation – impose large costs on firms.  
This paper proposes registration of short term liabilities as a means for 
monitoring systemic liquidity risk, with an incentive for comprehensive 
registration imposed by giving a right of rollover to all unregistered short term 
borrowing. It also proposes ‘cap and trade’ as an alternative to these liquidity 
regulations, controlling of maturity mismatch at the level of the system as a whole, 
rather than by regulation of individual institutions and individual markets. It is 
then possible to control the total of volume of registered short term funding 
through the requirement that these are backed by a fixed stock of tradable licenses. 
This achieves an efficient allocation of short term funding amongst alternative 
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uses. Registration, together with ‘cap and trade’ is a simple and effective way of 
preventing unsustainable expansion of credit financed by short term borrowing, 
whether inside or outside of the regulated banking system. 
Given the large amount of work already undertaken on the existing regulatory 
proposals for control of systemic liquidity risk, does it really make sense to 
abandon them now for this alternative proposal, even if it does offer some 
potential advantages? The answer is yes, it does make sense, for two reasons. The 
regulatory authorities are already substantially relaxing their proposals for Basel 
III liquidity regulation of banks. Current proposals for control of shadow banking 
could well suffer a similar fate. ‘Cap and trade’ may yet turn out to be the only 
effective way of implementing liquidity regulation.  
Another reason for giving serious consideration to register, cap and trade is 
that while, in theory central banks can use their wide range of monetary 
instruments to ensure that the global economy is neither ‘too hot’ nor ‘too cold, 
and so avoid the extremes of either unsustainable credit expansion or extended 
periods of demand deficiency. In practice policy making typically swings from one 
extreme to the other, only recognising and responding to the emergence of an 
unsustainable credit expansion once it is already underway and difficult to stop 
without creating a sharp economic contraction. ‘Cap and trade’ offers an effective 
and cost efficient tool for automatically preventing such unsustainable credit 
expansions when monetary policy is at is at its loosest. 
Register, cap and trade deserves serious consideration, and the first step 
towards implementing this policy, the creation of comprehensive asset and liability 
registers, should be pursued without delay, necessary as they are for other key 
elements of the global agenda for reform of the financial system, including 
ensuring all firms have credible ‘recovery and resolution’ plans i.e. any financial 
difficulties can be resolved without the need for tax payer support. 
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